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A bstrnct
'I'hi, paper presents an ucerlappiug-generatious model iu which government
debt i, used as a.u instr~nnc~nt to iucrea,c welfare of proseuL generations at the
cost of future gcuer:rLious. 'I'his iustrument is used stratcgically in the sense that
geueratiuu, are assruned to be able to calculate all possible paths of future taxes as
a frwctiou of the present tax rate. Every period fiscal policy is chosen according to
somu social welfare function. We compare a model where successive governments
use a myopic social welfare function which is the weighted average of the utili-
ties uf the generations present in that period, with a normative model where the
Kovrrnmeut takes account of the utilit,y of all eurrent and future generations. It
appr:cr.~ thal nndor buth inudols a conditiun cau bo dorived detenniuiug whether
governrnout debt will iucrease or decrease in lhe course of time.
1 Introduction
'I'hc rccouL gruwLó in govcrnnienL buelget de(icits in most cowctries has stressed the
inrportanceuf t.hc~ linrits on doht. arrunmlatiou. There is no simple way to determine these
liurits. I~,videutly, govcrumeut debt is bounded by a solvency constraint: like any debtor,
a guvc~nnucnL ranuut burruw inun~ Lhan il. is ablc~ tu rc~pay inclnding intcrest obligations.
"I'liis cunst.raiut. is blurred, liowcver, by the fact that a goverument, unlike an ordinary
debtor, lias an infinite horizou. Moreover, a creditor has not many legal instruments
tu (urcr a. ~;uvr~rnnu~iil. Lhat repurliatcs il.s clc~lrl. tu pay. Rut eve,n in the absence of debt
repudiation two yucstious determine how much a government can borrow: `what is it
able tu rehay', and `when is it. willing to repay'. "['his paper adresses both these questions.
"I'hc anawor Lu thc~sc~ yuc~sl.ions is cuinplic'ated by the fact that the future is involved,
i.c. c,xpcctations havo to be forrned. An important, feature of the present paper is
"1'his res~~:crch w:~~ spousurecl by the Economics liesearch Fouuclation, wlrich is part of the Nether-
lauds Organizatinu (or Scientific Research (N WO). Mailing adress: M. van de Ven, Dept. of Economics,
Tilburg l)uivi.rsity, ['O l3ox 90153, 5000 hE Tilburg, Netherlands.that expecta.tiuns are assiuned to Ix~ I'ormecl rationally. Moreover, it is assumed that
goverurneut policy has to be time consistent. Although the government as such is an
abstract entity that in principle exists forever, it is governed by subsequent generations
of finitely lived politiciaus. "I'hrre is no way a present politician is able to bind his
successors to a plauned pulicy. This does not imply that future policy is exogenously
given to the preseut politician: government debt is the instrument through which he is
able to influence future decisious.
[n order to answcr the fit'st. question posed (`what is the government, able to repay'),
Section 2 defines the set of possible policy choices by discussing conditions that guarantee
Lhr, viabilily uf a lisr;d pulicY. Viahility iti clc"fiin~d as Lhr" tniuinrnm requirement for
cmclibility uf liai'al pulicy and comprises twn ronclitions. 'I'he first is the well known No-
I'„nzi (~;unr~ (NI'(~) runcliti~,n which r~xciu~lc~. ;i p„licy uf runtiuually rulliug uver dcbL
by financing debt redrrmption and iuterest obligations by issuing new debt. The second
rundition for viability is feasibility, by which it is meant that the economy is able to raise
the planued tax receipts every period. As we abstract from monetary finance and other
fornts uf debt repudiation, the NPG condition implies that government debt is nothing
but a tempurarY postponemrnt of tax obligations.
As to t.hr" secund ynestion posed ('wheu is the governmr~ut williug to repay'), several
reasuns cau bc mentioued why puliticians want to pustpone repaying debt. Firstly, there
is thc staudarcl I~cyur~siau r~xplauation that a tempuraty rise in government expenditures
liuanced I,y dr~bf. leads to a Pareto improvetnenL. Other, positive, explanations do not
rely explicitly uu Lhe asswnption of excess capacity. Government debt may, for example,
also occur as a result of political iustability, as a cost of democracy (e.g. Cukierman
aud Mrltzer (19ii(i)) or due to a political business cycle (e.g. Alesina and Sachs (1988),
Roubini and 5achs (1989)). Assuming Iticardian debt neutrality (Barro (1974)) not to
hold, debt finauce ntatters tor two reasons. It redistributes revenue accross generations
and it. has a geucral eqnilibrium effect operating through the change in the interest
tate. C'ukierutan and Meltzer (1989) abstract from debt repudiation. In their model
govc"rnn,ont dc~l,t i. n~c",I a. an insl.rninr,nl tu gr~t arounrl t.br" nun-nc~gat.ivity const,raint
~~n Lrqncvln I;~I:in}; I,~~Ih ~~If,-rt~ inl.u;~rr„ui,l. 'I~h~~ n~.nll.inh ~~II„r;,l.iun ul wr~IfilPCafl'ruvti
gcncratiuns rlr~lu~ncls npun the rlr"grco uf all,ruistn uf parcuts. lu "L'abcllirri (1991) there is
twu sidr~cl altriiisin as wc~ll as au int.ragenc~ratiunal wr~lfarc clistribution. Moreover, he takes
ac ruunt uf t.h~- p~,,,ibilil,y uf rlc~hl. mpwlia,l.iun. Assnining I,hal, thr gcncral-cquilibrium
effect uf debt. is clumiuated by tlie direct effect ou the distribution of resources, he shows
1.hat au e~quilibriunt Icvc"I uf debt results that is completely honoured. Persson and
Svcnsson ( 19tiS)) aud Alesina and '1'abelliui (1990) take yet another route. Assumingsuccessiv(' Kcn('ratiun, Lo havo dilfcrenL preferences, they use a two-period model to
show t.haL guvernnreut debL ucay be used strategically between alternating governments
in ordcr to in(lucncc~ futurc policv cl(oiccs.
In Lhis papcr, au uvrrlapping gcncraLions moclcl is devcloped iu Section 3, in which
governn,eut debt is an instrument to increase welfare of present generations possibly at
the cosL of future generations. As in the work of Persson and Svensson, Tabellini and
Alesiua ancl "I"abelliui, Lhis iustruiueut is used strategically in the sense that its influence
on fuLure policy choices is explicitly taken into account. In particular, generations are
assumed Lu b(~ ablc to calcnlatr all possible paths of future taxes as a function of the
present tax rat.c ancl to pick the path that maximizes their welfare. Like Persson and
Svenssuu aud Alesina and 1'abellini, we abstract írom repudiation. Contrary to their
work, successive generations are assumed tu have identical preferences. We also abstract
from the assumption of altruism used by Cukierman and Meltzer and Tabellini. One
n,igtit Lhiuk t.haL this implies Lhat, the generations alive prefer the stock of debt to be
inc'rcased by :c.. (nu('h as putisiblc. "I'hi, is nul. t.hc rasc huwew('r, dnc 1.o Lhe difference in
planiiint; hurizuns. OI(I :rt;rnl.s. ha~'iiiK a v('iy nhurt. hurizun, will nuL havc Lo bear the
burden ul' lul.urc Lasr(tiuu :,ncl will iuclc:c~cl ~,refcr zero Laxes aud a uraxim(un increase in
debl.. 'I'hc' sainc hulJ, for Lho ~u,nig if t.h('v furescc Lhat t,hcy will be al,le to shift the
tax liabilitics incleli,~iLcly. Iluwcvcr, as Lhe young face a longer horizun than the old they
may expect tl,at the government will reach the limits of feasability within their lifetime
thus in,plying Lhat. thcy have to bear part of the future burden of debt in the form of
high t,ax raLes. `1'herefore, Lhcy mighL prefer a positive tax rate in order to smooth taxes
over Lhcir eutire planuiug horizon. This Lakes us to the question which fiscal policy
will be adopLcd. '1'hc government is viewed as a melting pot of different groups having
di(fcrcnt., pussil,ly cunllicting, interests. "fhese groups are compeLing among each other
for iufluen( e ou decisiuns to be made. The policy adopted reflects the interests of the
dif[ere:uL gruups to the extent they succeecl in this. Applied to the present model this
implies that every period fiscal policy is chosen according to some myopic social welfare
fuuct.ion which is Lhc weightecl average of Lhe utilities of the generations present in that
pcriud. Au expliciL sulution for the model is derived. It turns out that conditions can
be derived whi( h clel.erniine wheLher government deht will increase or decrease in the
courso of Li,nc.
In tic('Liuu I w'1' ('UIIU(II'1' LIII' 1'AS(' WIII`I'l' :r t;uv('rnn,c,il. n,axi,nizcs a(r'onventional) social
wclL(rc' fun(Iicm L:ckinq t.h(' ul.ilil.y uf all riirrcnL an(I fnt.nrc gencraLiuns iutu account.
s(,~'Ir,'i,i,~bly , t.hc ul,Lin,al cvulnLiun uf Lax rxLcx an(I guvcrn(ncut. clcbL LhaL follows from
Lhis nur,naLiv(' modcl docs nuL (liffcr essentially from the positive model of Section 3.}
Onl,y t,hc t.i,ning and spc~c,d of thc- adjustnu,nts differ. Again condit,ions can be derived
uudcr which I,hc~ govc,runn,nl dc~bt will docrrasc, ur iucroasc in thc coursc of timc. Some
comments on these results will be cnadc iu the final section.
2 On the viability of fiscal policy
This section describes conditio~s that guarantee the viability of fiscal policy and thus
defines thc~ fraincwork for tbe following sections.
'Phe governnieiit, budget deficit. U iu period t is defined as:
l)~ - ~'i-i ~c-, f Cc - Ti (2-1)
where (3 is the a,nount, of debt at the end of the period, G is government expenditure, T
are the tax rcveuues and r is the interest rate. [n principle, there are two ways to finance
this deficit, borrowing and monetary finance. Monetary finance can be seen as a special
furni uf clc~bl, repndia.t.iou. Ilowc~ver, ral,ional lenders will take accouut of the possibility
uf repudiation. Wheu it, is advantageous for a government to repudiate, cational lenders
will anticipa.l.e this aud iucrrrasr~ the required iuterest rate by the anticipated repudiation
(iuflatiou) ra.tc~. Ilcua~, thrrc is no optima~l rate of repndiation'. Only surprise repudi-
ation n,ay bc a,dvaiitageous. "fhc~ bcuefit u,ay he outwcighed by negative reputational
effects however. In the sequel we abstract from the possibility of rnonetary finanee and
r,~pn,IÍxl.iun. In Lha.t ~'au~ ,~~t. ('! I),~an I„~ r,~wril.t,~n as:
H~ -( I t rc-i ) f~,- i~- C~c - 'Cc (2-Z)
Aggregatiug Lbis forward fruni pc~riud l un tu a final period re we get the government's
intcrtempural budgc~t consiraiut:
l3~ -~{,.,, f3„ f ~ l~,,,(a; - C1, )
,-cf,
(2-3)
wherr. Rc,, - j-jh-ct~ ~tr~- is the discomit factor.
'I'he first condition for the viabilit,y of fisca.l policy is the NPG condition that limits the
growth of govcrnntcnt dcht.:
lim Iic.,,L3„ - 0 (2-4)
-~ Calvo(19825) developes a framework with perfect foresight where debt is partly repudiated. Lenders
anticipate on this by requiring the appropríate interest rate. However au exogenous cost of repudiation
has to be assumed otherwise uo government debt would exist since it would totally be repudiated.for every r. If this condition is sa.tisfied, the intertemporal budget constraint can be
writtc~n a,s
rrL Z rrL.,l"r; r;,l (z-r,)
,cL}L
It tells that the preseut debt has to be met by future primary surpluses.
The sccond re~yuire~nu~nt for viability is feasibility. As Kremers ( 1989) pointed out, the
titnc pattcru uf taxrs assocíatcd with Lhc iutcrtcutpural budgct constraint rnay cause
taxes to grow faster tha,n taxing capacity and may thus violate the government's collateral
which is fur pL~riod 1 givrn Iry
~,L - T,~.nr
Í
where r""'' is the rnaxirnunL feasible tax rate, i' is CNP aud thc~ discoLmt factor is given
by' QL,~ - r[h-L}r it,~;-~ where p is the growth rate of GNP. Therefore as an additional






f~.i r~~.r~' l. i. , in ~.v~~r~ ~~.~ri~~~l I ili~~ I.~t.~l .iin~~iLnt ~~f I:~~~,~: n~~~,~l~~~l frnnL Llu~n nn L~L
,:~tisl'y thc~ NI'(i cuudition ducv nuL exreecl I,he nraxiinuni total ainount of taxes that can
be collectc~d fronL thcn ou. Viola.tion oí the collateral cau only occur if it is finite. This is
the case if thc average growth rate of GNP is smaller than the average interest rate, i.e.,
when the e~couomy is dynamically efficient. Note that since ~ Rt,;T; - Bt ~~ Rt,;G; we
must have that the average growth rate of government expenditure G does not exceed
the average growth rate of GNP. When the rate of growth of GNP and the interest rate
are consta.nt., the collateral together with the NPG condition is sufficient for the ratio of
debt tu GNP I,u hc boundedl. So one ca.u calculal,e au upperbouud for the debt-GNP
ratiu based on average growth and interest rates. lt cannot be excluded, however, that
the clcbt.GNP ratio is temporaaily above this `average upperbound' because actua] rates
may di(G~r fruni avcragc rat.es.
"I'here ILas been done some enLpirica,l work on whether present budget deficits are in
line with Lhe guvernmeut's intertemporal buclget constraint and the collateral condition.
Based un Lhe model developed by Barro ( 1979), frameworks which allow for testing this
'ConLrary Lo Lhe auggesLion wadr hy Kremer,, Lhc reverse is noL true. A counte[example can easily
bc coust.rucLrJ.were built by I lamilton aud Flavin (191;6), l~remers (1989) and Hakkio and Rush (1991)
among others. lu their empirical wurk, attention is focused on the United States. The
conunou conclusiou reached is that until recent years the development of the deficit
st,ayed in liue with tFtc growth of GNP. But extensive growth of the budget deficit lately
might bc inconsistent, wit.ó the government's intertemporal budget constraint. However
thc~ n~a.l I[~ssun tu bc, Ic,arn[,d frurn Lltis litc,ratur[~ is thal. il. ix ha.nl Lo tcst whcther the
present budget deficit violates the intertetrrporal budget constraiut. Not only technical
nt:rt lc,rs likr liuitr samplt' prope~rl.ies of cuint[~grat,ion or misspeci(icat.ion lead to problems
but especially the fact that unavoidably future policy is involved in these tests. The fact
that the dehl.-CNP ratio is temporarily above its average upperbound does not suffice
to couclude t,hal. the iutertemporal budget. constraint is violated.
`I'aking t.ho collateral as an rxtra condition next to the NPC condition is therefore not
aufficienL tu ensure Lhe viability of fiscal policy. Time patterns of taxes that satisfy
the collateral condil,ion may iuclucle tax rates tl~rat exceed the maximum feasible tax
r:rtc. So, in order Lo exclnch, tinre paths where the tax rate is temporarily above its
inaxlinillll, A.11 addil.ionn.l cunstraint is necessary. Morcover, we assume that the tax rate
is non-negative~'. llence, we have the following condition for feasibility:
0 G rr C r,na' ~2-8~
for eve~ry l. Siuce this is a~u[licient aouditiou [or the collateral condition to be satisfied
thc la,tter c an bc~ disra.rclc~cl. Su, t.h[~ vet ul' viablc~ fiscal policies is defined by the NPG
cundition ('?-4 ) tog[~th[~r with the feasibility condition (2-b). Which policy will be chosen
frutn Lliis s[,l clcyrend. un Lhc~ clc~c isiun ntakiup; prucrx,. 'I'his is t.hc suh.jcct of the following
xi~rLiun.
3 Decision making when governments are myopic
7'his section focuses ou tlte decision makiug process on fiscal policies in which explicit
accouut is t.akc~u uf the viabilitc coudit.ions derived in the previous section". Moreover,
thc guvcrnmeut. is assutuecl uot tu take account of the utility of future generations. As
'Notc~ that the existence of a lower bound for Lhe t.ax rate necessitates a(negative) minimal value
liir thc ainount of govcrruueut debt, Le., a maximuui for governorent wealth. Since the government is
not alluwccl Lo make neL t.ransfers (a uegative tax ratc) to the private sector and has to obey the NPG
cunditiou guvenuuent wealth cannot exceed the preseuL value of future government expenditures.
91ielaxaLiou of the viability conditions by dispeusing of the NPG condition is possible. However,
in this case. Lu preveul the goverument rwiniug Ponzi schemes would require explicit modelling of the
capital inarket. Hy adopting the ~PG condition it is implicitly assumed that there is a capital market
thal eusums tlir govrruineuó to obey Lhc- NPG couclitiou.7
we have seen in the introduction, the fiscal policy preferred may depend on an agent's
planning horizon. Conflicts of interest between agents may arise even if their preferences
can be characterized by the same utility function if they have different planning horizons.
Within an ovcrlapping-geuera,tions model these conflicts can easily be illustrated. We
will ;tssuntr twu y;vnrrat,iuns uf oyual size5, old a.nd young, to be present at the same
titnr. N hilc` t.hr uld wuuld I,rrfc`r contplcte tax shiftiug, the young may be interested in
policies tbat. stuuuth taxes over I,heir lifetinte. The role of the government is confined to
optirniziug a function that consists of the utility of the two generations, old and young,
presently a.live. Thus, if we denote consumption of the old and the young at time t by
respectively r.i' and c; and utility by a function U', i- o, y, we get for the objective
function o( the goveruntenL at time t:
w(-W~t)~~~r), l~Y(ci.c'~ti)~ (3-9)
Notice tbat as stated above the govermnent at tinre t is assutned to be myopic in the
sense that it does not take account of the utility o[ future generations. In that respect the
objective functiou of thc` goverutnent differs from a social welfare fwrction which explicitly
takes account of the utility of all futru-e generations. The next section will take a closer a
look a.t a social Wl`IfB.I'l' fUllci.lOn. In Otll' b'Ifw' t.he government is a reflection of the different
gruups pn:tieul. iti I,he` soci(~I,y''. Since' these gruups ar(` not altruistic iu the sense that they
care about f~tl,tuc genc`ra.tiuus, thc` goverument will not ca.re either. To avoid unnecessary
confusiun w(` will hencefortó n'fc`r tu this short sighted social welfare function as a decision
[tutct.iou. In optiruizing the dccisiou function (3-9) the government takes account of the
dc`Ix~nde~ncy uf Lhc saving, by Lhc in(livi(lu.(L, in I,h(` privat(` s(`cLur un the tax rate. This
tnakes it act as a. Stackelberg leader towards the private sector. Furthermore, the decision
frwction also reflects thc` fact tFtat governments in different periods may differ from each
ol.h(`r. "I'hrnd(n(`, t.h(` ticul,(` fur (i.( al puliry fur an inc ntnbc`nl. guvc`rutnc`nt is confincd to
Lhc~ prcwrnl, I,c`riod. It has, howc`vc`r, intplira~t.ions for t.ho actions to br. taken by future
governntents. Wr asautne that the current government takes account of these actions in
thc clecision ntaking. 'I'his mea.ns that it a.lso acts as a Stackelberg leader towards all
futurc gov(~runtcuts'.
5'I'he rat.e~ nf populat.ion growth is implicitly assumrd tn be zero. It would not. change the following
resulLs if p,~puluLiuu gruwtó wa.~~ ;illuwcd fur.
~For a hchavioural w(derpiuuiug of this view, see Coughliu eL xl. ( I990).
' Veall ( 19k6) presents a inodel which explains the emerging of a social security system financed on
a pay-as-you-gu basic l1e :usu(nes SLackelberg behavior ouly towards the uext generation and Nash
towards suh,eyucnt geucrat.ious "I'his i5 duc to the neces~ity ofhaving an infinite horizon which otherwise
wnuld give an iusolnbl,` prohlem. 'Ia6,`Ilini us(`s a Lwo period ,nodel to derive a political viable set of
J(~bl. '1'h, lirst g(~ucration acL.. a, a 5tackelberg Ieader Low;(rds Lhe secoud generation Furthermore heSince the government takes account of the savings behavior of the private sector we
first nc-~cd to Lakc~ a closer lool: at the privatc sector. As already mentioned we take
an overlal,l,ing gcucral.ious iuodel where~ Lwo gc~neratious, old aud young, are present at
the same t.irne. h.ach iudividnal lives for two periods. In the first period he is endowed
with one unit of income o( whiclr he saves an amount s. He has to pay taxes over the
rrmaining part. The rest is used for consumption, which therefore equals:
c~ - (I - rc)(l - `c) (3-10)
where r is the tax rate. When lie is old the savings including the interest revenues net
of taxes are consumed:
cifc - (l - rct~)){sc (3-11)
wliere I{ - I f r is the interest ratc~ whicli is assumeel to be coustant. "1'he young optimize
a lifetime utility fuuctiou ( ~y(c~,c~ti) subject to eqs. (3-10) and ( 3-11). The instrument
in thc~ upt in,izatiou i, the, s:wings ratc. Heucc, Lhc lirst.-order condition reads:
i)(i" i)f"~ i11'~
( I- rc) t-I{( I- r~ti ) - 0 (3-í~)
t)s, - - t)r; ~)cit i
From Lhis follows s~ - s;(r,, rct, ) as the optimal auwrmL of savings. In the optimization
of e~y. (3-9) t.Le govc,rnnceul cxplicitly takes accounl. of .tii. i'rorn eqs. (3-]0) and (3-11)
iL (ollows L}ial tutal tax rcvc~nuc~ cqua,ls
7'c - r~l I -.ti~ f N.,,-, ) (3-13)
Insc~rl,ing t.hi, in Lhc~ govonnnc~nt's hudgc~t ronst.ra.int (2-2) ~nd rewrit,ing it gives:
l{It,-i -í (~~ - )jc f rc(l - ~'c f !t's,-i) (3-14)
The i,ax ral,c~ sc:~t, by the governmeut follows írorn the maximization of eq. (3-9) subject
to ey. (3-la). i1ssuiuiug au intrrior solution the first ot'der condition reads:
i)W', i)W, ~I(!"
!?s' t
8r, - r)1 ~~ r)r;' (- ~-~ )
i1W, t)L~y f ~si
i1114{-vci
I(I-Si)-{-(I-rc)~)r, t
~~xpli~it.ly n~,~~ds all,rui~iu b~~LwrrufR~~n~~ral.ion.~ aud hrtorogcueity withiu ge~nerations.(1
(~(~" (~.a' (~r' j
rlcitt ( l- rift)~~~ri - l{s~ ~J~- 0 (3-15)
rï~t is the tax rate seL by the next period govcrnment8. Note that ritr is a function of
r~ reflecting the fact that an incumbent government acts as a Stackelberg leader towards
future govf~rnments. In eq. (3-15) thc terms a~ and aa L can be interpreted as the
margiual pulit.iral power of the old aucl the young respectively. If aU equals zero, the
old are sulcly decisive for the tax rate. As a result the tax rate will be set at its lowest
pussiLlr~ I~,~i,l giv,,n Lhc~ viabilil~ uf thr intplic~l liscal policy. á~ equal to zero means
thaL thi, young havc full i untrol uver the tax rate. lu this case iuserting eq. (3-12) into
c~y. (3 Ii) and re~wriliug givcs





Por any l il will hold that ~,~ t' G 0. "I'Itis is a. conseyuence of the fact that if the political
power of th~~ ~~uung is non-negligible, the governrnent is urged to trade-off current and
futurc tax rate,., gi~i~n Lh,~ Stni la~lhi,rg a.asntnpl.iun I,htt.l, iL tal:on account u( Lhe relatiou
ba,l,wtv,n ihi~ rnrmnt n.nd all furnrr tax ratcs. !` lower rurrcnL tax rate will lead to a
hil;hi,r ~li,hl inhi~ritt.,l hy Lh,~ ni~xt. gi,ui~r:rl.iuu whirh as a rc~xitll, tnighL havc to opt fur a
highc~r t:rs ra.ti~'. r~ccurding tu ,~y. (a-lli) Lhi, gaiu iu currcut cunsumptiou and the loss
iu future cunsumption for the ,youug which results from tax shifting will preferably be
set by tht,m su that on th~~ tnargin I,ho desirt~d intcrtemporal alloca.tion oí consumption
retnains unimpa,ired.
To derive an c~xplicit solution wr assume that the marginal political power of the two
generatiuns is const.anl. ancl nurnta.lized so that a- ái ó- 1- á~W and 0 G~ G 1.
['urthertnure, wo takc~ the utilit}~ [uuction to be oí a logaritmic type, i.e., U~ -(n(cx) f
f)hr(ci'~t ), where 0 is t,he private discount factor. }~inally we assume C to be constant and
set, r„"" ~~qu:rl tu I. (~ivt,ti Lhr,ai~ assutuptiuns, it imntcdiatcly follows from eq. (3-12)
that the yuuug chousr si -~t~ for all t. Since we assumed the government to be a
SLackclbcrg li~a.dcr tuwa.rds thc hrivatt~ sector iL takes a.ccouut of s'. Iuserting s' in eq.
(3-15) givt~s for the lirst orcler cuudition fur the goverument:
(IT'
(I-r~tt)t0(1-~)(I-rr) . r)rt-O t
(3-17)
"Siur,~ tl,,,y :,m nxtinnicd Lu br SLxck,~lbrrg Irad,~r tu t.h,~ir succcs.u,rs, implicit.ly account is tak,~n in
riti of ritz,..., r~,.
"'fhis is, I~uwrvrr, uot u~~ce~ssary. The tax rise may br post~,onPd until period t t 2 or later, leaving
t~{ i uualfrrtr,l. In LI~aL ravc Lhr int,~rr i.n of Lhi~ yomir; aud uld coincide.I ll
for l- I,... , oc. Nutir.o in cy. (:i-1 ï) t.hat aa extx~cted the relation betwee~n the current
aud future tax rate is of importance ouly if tlre young have some political power, i.e.,
a G 1. At auy 1,ime t, the governrnent as a Stackelberg leader towards future governments
knows that future governments use eq. (3-17) to solve for the tax rate. To derive a
solution for the infinite horizon problem we first solve the finite horizon problem and
tlreu arrive at a sohrtion for t,he infiuite Irorizon problem as the limit of the finite horizon
problem. ilssume the tinie Irorizon to bc finite, n, and take the finite horizon equivalent
of the NPC cunclition:
)3„ - 0 (3-18)
'1'he calcul:ct.iun is c~xecuted backward sl,art.ing in the final period n. In that period there
an~ nu .nvin~;, :cn~l t.hr };~w~~riunriil liati nu rlioic c, I~ul. tu ulx,.Y Llir NPC condit,iun. "I'he
Lax ra.Lr iu Lhc~ liual pcriucl thrn fulluws iinmc~cliatuly frunr tlic budget coustraint:
I f0
r,~ - I f(I f!{)O(!{lj,~-i t C;) (3-19)
At periud re - I, the iucumbc,ut, governnieut explicitly takes account of eq. (3-19).
lnserting it. in its owu budget constraint and taking the derivative with respect to r„-r
gives
[Jr,~ - - R 1 -{- RO
~)r„-i I -F ( I -F R)0
(3-20)
Inscrting eqs. (3-19) and ( 3-'?0) into eq. ( 3-17) and solving for r„-1 gives for the interior
solutiou
r,('.;~-i - R(I 4 1{0)[0(~)~ ~) f I]
{~,~-s ~ 1 Ii1RGf
}(I~l{Il)(t7(l-a)R-]]-Bl
(3-21)
(1 t 0)R'~ 1
"faking arroiuit uf I,lio cuiisl.r~rints givc~ii by c~qs. ('?-8) and (3-Ih) thc~ wholc solution for
pe~riucl n- I is givc~u I~Y
, ~ ~);á,,,, ~ ii„-~ ~ i3„
i j L3 C L3, 2 G g,~~a~
~j l3,~-z - [3na~
(3-22)ll
wherc B;;"" --~r~(: is equal to ruinua thc discowitec( value of the total íuture govern-
ment expendiLcues. lí the inheritecl government debt equals this value a zero tax rate
can bc niaintaincd forevc~r. AL the other extrcme, Bma -- IfRG' ~. ( rtRe)(Rtr)tB ives
n R~ (1tB)R~ g
Lhc ni:cxininni ~inwinit ol clcLt ~russil~lc withuut viulating Lhc NPG cundition cq. (3-18).
r",", i, clclinc~J Iry t,hc~ runst.rainl.s on r, cy. (L ~) aud thc NI'(; couditiuu cy. (3-18).
An illustration is pro~'ided in Pigure l. The dashed lines in Figure 1 are given by the
T„-.~
.rmar
~ ~„-t ~n,~ ~ B;t` r
( zr ) I~ignrc I: [Vlyopic solution for period rr - I(h~
cuustraiuts ou r, ey. ('~-S), auel the NPC condition, eq. (3-18). Given some inherited
value of the debt B„-1 the thick liue indicates the tas rate chosen at time n- 1. Notice
frorn the ligurc th.rt t.wo scts of solutions a.re possibla In particular, in Figure la the
tax ratc will bc set cynal to 0[ur a range of values of B„-2, while in Figure lb r- 0
will only hc. chuscn if thc iuhcritccl ek~ht is at its minimum Ievel, i.c., a surplus which is
exactly sufficicut for liuaucing a.ll currcut aucl future government outlays. The difference
betwcx,n these twu sulutions holcls true for the general solution as we will see below.
Given cy. (3-'LZ) thc solutiou for the tax rate ri-z, r„-3 and so on can be obtained in
the same way. The solution for rc ( t - 1, ..., r7 - 1) is provided in the Appendix.
As thc horizon of this government is assumecl infinitely long, we have to find a solution
for Lhc infinite horizon analoguc of the model. 1'his solution can be obtained as the limit
uf I,hc u prriucl nwclc~l~u. ~I~hc gc~in~t'al wluLiun t.lic~ii rcacls:
~c"I'h:ct tóc~ liniii uf t.hc .olurinu ~~f rhr liuirr horizon t~rublein is iudced n solution Cor the infinite
lu~riz~m prublc~ui i. ~:c.,ily ~~~ru liy wririu~; d„wn ~.h~~ lir~r unlc~r c~ouditiom of thc~ iufinitc~ horir.on model
auJ rh~~rkiuy; Lhc. c.mdiclar~ .ulu~i.~u1 'l
w'bet't
T ~ri„~ ~ ~ ~f,,,~,~ ` l3, i C R,,.
tj ~3x, G~~-, G~mns
~j Bt t- Rmar
0 i(
T,,,,, -
ttB R c ~
í~tn ~~j,-i ~- ~t-i ~ c.
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~t-t f R-i ~ 1tB R(R-t) 1
,~ ll(I a)(l~-I)-I C11
~j o(1-a)(R-1)-l~0
~,~t.A () f ~)R
Tx.t -(o(i-,i)t)]OtRO) {et-~ f R~ 1~
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fur ItA ~ l~,-i c l3Att k- I,....~
whcm
R~-- ~ ~ )fR~ ~(Rk}I-))(1-~)~Qk-((1-i~)~~1]k(R-1)~
- R- I (I t0)R (I -~)Ar7~(R- 1)Rk
(3-23)
Agaiu L1""" aucl l3""'r cornsponcl to the ntinimum and tLe maximurn amount of debt
wherc Bn"" equals I,he~ ininu~ uf a.ll discountc,d fctl.ure goverment expenditures so that if1:3
the inheritecí debt eyuals B"""` a iero tax rate cau be maintained forever. Bmos corre-
sponds to the maxirnnm amormt of dcbt possible withont violating the NPG conditionrr.
higurc L pruvi~lrs .r f;ra,phical illustratiuu.
rr
(:r) 0( I- a)( la'~ - 1)- I c 0
i T~
(b) 0(I-~)(li-I)-I~U
Figure 2: blyopic solution for the infinite horizon case
From eq. (3-'L3) it appcars that two regimes, (a) and (b), are relevant. These tegimes are
Lhe generalization of the regimes that already became apparent from Figure 1. As will
hecuine ch~ar fruin Nrupusil.iou 3.1 beluw, thcsr, reginies correspond to the case where
governmcut dcbt is uou-decreasing, respectively, non-increasing in time. Which of the
regirnes prevails depends on [' - 0(] -~)(R - 1) - 1. Intuitively spoken, if the future is
of rclativcly luw inrportance so tbat I~ C 0, Lhcu a zcro tax rate will be chosen for a range
oC realizal,ious of I3~-r. Note that the futurc can be relatively `unimportant' if the young
have a low private discount rate 0, if they have low political power 1-~ compared to the
old, or if thc rcturn, R- 1, ou their savings is low. The behaviour of the two generations
present is, in essencc, the same in both cases, I' G 0, respectively, P~ 0. The old prefer
thi~ tax ratc Lu hc sct as low as possihlc and shifL th~~ burdeu of taxation ovcr Lo futurc
generations. 'fhe yowig prefer arnoothing of the tax burden over their lifetime.
'I'he exact pattern of the txx ra.te can be described as follows. If 1' G 0(a) prevails and
the tax rate will be set equal to zero if the iuherited debt Br-r is below a threshold value,
B~. Obviously, 6 depends on the political power parameter a, the private discount
rate 0 and the interest rate R. For higher values oï a the threshold value will be higher.
1'he intuition behind this is as follows: a higher value of 1 corresponds to more power for
rrThe conditions defining the viable set of fiscal policies in section 2 were sufficient for the debt-GNP
ratio to be bounded provided there were constant growth and interest rates. Since this is the case and,
mureover, CNP is .~ssumed to be coustant, an upperbound to the amount of debt can be given, Bmas14
the old. They want to keep the tax rate as low as possible. The higher the threshold value
the longer it takes hefore the inherited debt Bc-~ exceeds the threshold value and, thus,
thc~ lun~;c~r the~ taa rrctr can hi, zeru. In particular, if t.he old havr all political power, i.e.,
a- I, thc~ tax rate is cocuplr~tely deterniined by Ihe, viability conditions. Hence, the tax
ralr c~ ill Lo sot al, zc~ro as long as Lhc~ viahility conrlitions are obeyccl. 'I'hen it will in one
ur twu pc-riod, juncp tu its cn:c.xicuuni value. If thc young have some political influence,
i.a., ~ C l, the time pattern of the tax rate will be smoothed over time. The higher R the
higher first period taxes as preferred by the young. In other words, the lower the young
waut thc guverniucnt debt to be. 1'he reason for this is twofold. Firstly, for higher values
uf R the goverumecd, clebt will rise faster, so that higher taxes are necessary. Secondly,
higher values of R ntake it more attractive for the young to save through the government.
Because of the compensatiug furces of the income and substitution effects changes in R
do not aHect private savings. Saving tluough the government by levying relatively higher
taxes uow iu rc~tiuu for luwer taxeti in tlie futcnc~, huwever, generates a`collective' return
because older gcnerations cuntribute iu ciecreasing the government debt without sharing
in the fruits uf thc~sc c~ffurts. "I'his becunu~s part.icnlary clear if I' ~ 0, case (b). In that
case thc tax ra,tc, will clr~c rcasc iu Licnc, ituplying that the young, Lhrough the forced tax
coutributiuns of the old, receive a. óigh ' return' on their 'governmental' saving because
thcy havc~ a lowcr futcn'e La~ rate.
7'hc~ cliffere~urc~ betwc,en I,he~ I wo mginu~s I' C 0 ancl I' ~ 0 becornes clear from Figure 2. If
in casc~ a. I hc inhoritc~rl guvcniinciit cle,bt is bcluw Lhe threshold value ~ the tax rate is
sc~t cr(ual tu thc~ luwerbouucl rc~ro. Ot,herwise~ a ne~gative t,ax rxte would result in a positive
guvernn~rnt clrLt a.l. t.hr cucl uf Ihc planniug óurizun and Lhc NPG conditiion would be
viulatecL On the other haucl if in casc~ b. the inherited government debt is below the
thresholcl valnc, 13x, thc~ tax ratc~ is sel, c~c{ual to an upperbound, since keeping the tax
ra.tc~ ec(ual tu r,'i wuttlcl cn~;rLe a,nrplns whicli exceeds the~ total discounted valtte of all
futcuo goverunccut c~xpcuclitcu~es, !3""". '1'his would leave a negative government debt,
or a surplus, at thc end of the planning horizon and thus violate the NPG condition.
f~url,herinurc, nut.ice Lhat R""" :~nd B""" r,re complc~tely determined by the~ variables G12,
H ancl 0, wliilc~ thc~ f.hn~shulcl v;cluc~ l1,~, .cl~u Jrpc~ucls ou thc~ pulit,iral puwer paran,eter
~-Nm.~~ rónt (: ha.~ ti~ I,~~ l,rlow t.h~ t~~ral i.:rs ba.:~ r,f n prrind, '~ since t.his is lhr m:ucimum possible
:uuninil. ~~f La~~~.. l~~ br r;u.,~.~1 Iinni~~Ju~Lrly ii fulluw, rha1. ;ui in~~rre~sr (decrr.~~i~) in C causes R"'"s 60
drrrr;i.a~ (inrr,~~~.~.). 'I'lu~ rIG.~.~ ~d-n rhnny;r in !( uu li"~",~ i.. hnwrvrr, nnibit;uon~ siucc iL depeuds on 1,6e
iu:rKuiiuJ~. ,~I' iln- ~~rvrruin~~nt'n rsp~~n~ld.nn~. (í :~n r:m hr .~~on fnnn LI~r lira ~~nlrr drrival.iv~~ nf I7.,~"r
wil.h rra~~.ri l~~ lí
8li"'~r c, - i
~n ;r n~r.~ i
tiR 1
il(-I)~ 1~0 if IGCG ~-tes15
~. Withiu a regime the specific values of the parameters determine the speed by which
the tax rate and the debt develop. In particular,in case (a) the threshold value B
will be lower and t.Le tax rate will be higher for au increase in the politica) power of
the youug. lu case (b) au incrc,:~,c~ uf the pulitical power o[ tlte youug irnplies a rotation
of the interior solution around (B"`ar r"'ar) so that the range for the interior solution
gets narrower, and the interior solution itself gets larger. The direction of the evolution
of the tax rate and the government debt is completely determined by the occurence of
oue of buth regimes. 'I'his becornes clear in the following proposition which states the
resulting patterns of r, and Bc:
Proposition 3.1 If B""" G Be G Bmar a G I and 0)
(a) Ij0(i - a)(R- I) - I G 0 the.rr
Bc-i G Bc éf 0( I- a)(R - 1) - 1 G 0
Be-, - B, vj U(1 -~)(R - 1) - 1- 0
rx,.c-t ~ rw,c
(b) If U( I -~)( ll - I)- I~ 0 lh.en
Bc-t ~ B~
rx, c i ~ rx,.t
0 we hnve for every finite t:
Nut.e thal if Bu wuuhl c,yual B""" (respcctivc,ly B""") wc would br~ left with a trivial
case wherc B~ cquals B"'a' (B""") and r, would equal r"'a' ( r'"'") for every t. We
alsu abst.ainc~d frotn thr case where the old are solely decisive, i.e., ~ equal to one. lf
~- 1 the tax ratr, will be set at its lower bounds every period which implies that
debt will reaclt its maxinwm iu finite time. As soon as the young have some influence
in the political process, i.e., a smaller than one, we see from Proposition 3.1 that in
catie (a), il U( I -~)( h' - I)- I G 0, Bc is stricl, tnonotonic. 'lYiis implies that Bmar
never will be reached in finite time. Strict monotonicity of Bc implies non stationarity
thuugh the viability conditions are satisfied. This raises some additional doubt beside
thc~ poiuf, madc~ iu sr~rtion 2 on the valuc of the~ empirical research into the solvency of
t.hr ~;uvc~rninc,nl. ( 'un~ rary tu I hc~ aatiinptiun nta,lc~ in c~tupirica.l t'c~w~arch a continuously
inrn~a,siug di~Lt ( ~NI' ral.iu ncc~~l nut,untraclirl, nulvc~ury ul Ihc~ guvc~ruiucul..
Which ul' Ihc~ ~:~..c~ti uf Prupusit.iun :i. l will pm~ail rlepends un thc~ relation between R, a
and Il. In I,arl,irular, fur a givc~u caluc~ ul ~ anrl U, thc tax ratc will bc uuu-iucreasiug
1'hus, i( G is lower thau total income in the privat~~ seetor net of interest payments, then an increase
(dr,crease) in !C causes N"'ar to decrease (iucrease). If C is above total income net of interest payments,
the effect, o( a chnnge in R beco~nes reverse. Usually, G G 1 can be assumed.I t;
if R is high enuugh. 7'his correspunds with the result derived from solution ( 3-23) that
the lower the value uf R the nrore the interests of the yormg and the old coincide. Some
n~iorc comincnts will hc inadc iu thc final section.
4 Decision making when governments maximise so-
cial welfare
In thc previuus ,cctiou some fiscal policy was chosen according to a decision function
in which thr conflicl,ing inte~rests of thc generations present was reflected. There the
guvernrucut was seen as a n,eltiug pot of these different genera.tions and did only care
ahout the utilit.y uf futurc geucrations as far as the generations present did. Instead of
a.vsiunin~; Lhr, ~;uvr,rnrnciit Lu hr niyupir in t.his sc~ntic thc govcrnrncnt ca.n he taken as
a sucial upt.inrizcr, nraxirnising a aucial welfare fuuction wlrich gives a Pareto optimal
allocation uf t.axes over time. The government can be seen as an everlasting social
dictatur. ('ompared tu the previuus section tlris approach is of a more normative nature
and must, (irst uf all be seeu as a benchmark case to which the decision making outcome
of the previous section can he compared. The government is now assumed to optimize
a social welfarr fuuctiuu of the [ollowing form
lti,..,,, -
C`P~f~Ir'i.c'~ti) `-Le (4-24)
wherc p e I is a discuunt fact,or.
Usiug thc sanre assuinptions as in tlic previous sectiou to derive an explicit solution, we
get
.r„~~~~ ;f 'j„~~„ c B~-, C HT,~
Tx;;i - r,x,i',,,~ i.~ 13,',~,` ~ l3r-r G g,,,,,~
r,,,~~~ ~f ~~ ~ - 8,,,,,r
(4-2.5)
whc~n~
r; .ti f Itu~(IrF-~
ir i - (Ir-ill~ ~~)litn)r
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R(rl}RB}oj ~Bt-1 t R~t -f- IR-t)(i~-vjlr}Bjv~Rp - 1)] ij Rp G 1
r(Rt-r) ij Rp 1 1
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation. The solution for r~"~''o` if Rp ~ 1 is given
rt Tt
(a) Rp G 0 ~b) RP ~ 0
Figure 3: Social solution for the infinite óoriwn case
in the appendix. Equivalcnt to k'roposition 3.1 we derive
Propositiou 4.1 Ij L3""" G Bo G!3'"ar iae have jar every firaite t:
(a) Ij Rp - 1 C 0 then
I3t-~ G Bt ij Rp - l G 0
13t-, - Bi ij Rp - I - o
rx,',i-~ G rw,t
(b) !j Rp - I ~ 0 thrn.
L3t-~ ~ l3,
~~~
r,~,i-i J r ,r
Notice that just as in tkre positive analysis of Section 3 there are two difCerent regimes
(!{p G 1 and ILp ~ I respectively), where tax rates and government debt move in
dif[creut directions in the cotn'se of time13. In case ( a) where Rp C 1 the tax rate will be
13Which caye prevails depends on whether Rp - 1 is positive, negative or zero. This condition can
be rewritten to get rS! - l, siuce 2 e 1 f r. 'fhe right-hand-side ot this condition is the rate of time
preference. Ilence, i[?t~ie interest rate is below the rate of time preference, debt increases monotonic
over time aud, vice versa, an interest rate above the rate of time preference induces debt to decrease
monotonically.set eyual to r""" if thr iuberited debt is bclow a threshold value, B'o`. 'I'his threshold
value is decreasing in p. Highrr values of p means more weight attached to the utility
oi futurc geuc~ratioua. 'I'hc tax rate will bc seL above tlte zero level sooner to decrease
the burden of taxation for future generations siuce the weight attached to their utility
is higher. 'fhe resemblance between this case and case (a) (Figure 2a) of the previous
section is obvious. The interpretation is analogous: in both cases the future plays a
relatively w,important role. This is reflected in the relative low values of B, 1- 1 and R
in the fonner case and of R and p in the ]atter case. However in the normative analysis
the welfarc~ of all fuUue generations is taken into account in determining the optimal
allocatiou of taxes aud governn,rnL debt over time, while in the positive analysis of the
previous srct.ion unly t.l,e futurr utility of the c,u.rent young is of direct importance.
Only indire~rtly through t.hc~ Starke~lhc~rg assumption thf~ current. govcrnment takes the
n~acLiuns of fnLcuc gc~ncrations un L6e~ pre~scnt policy into acco,n,L. Ncvertheless the
evolution uf thc tax rates aud the debt are esseutially the same. It can easily be checked
that R'~' c an lu~ .,nallc~r as well as la.r,~c,r t.han R.~.. 4u, a govE~rumc~nt ma.ximizing a social
weH~arc iunctiou n,ay ~,pt fur a, lacgcr Lax rate, Lha,n thc n~yupic govcruntenl, of SecLion 3,
thus implying a fastrr increase uf government debt in time.
For Lhe re~gime Rp ~ 1 aud its couuterpart of the previous section, the tax rate under
social welfarc nraximization can be larger as well as smaller than the tax rate chosen by
a myopic gove~rument. Figure 4 provides an exarnple where for a range of values of the
rc
Figurc d:
inhc~riLc~il ,~„w~rnnu~nt dc~l,t., Lhc~ i,iLrrva.l (If", li~), t.hc~ .ucia.l optirnizc~r choosc~s largcr
a tax ratc~ t.hau Lhc~ inyopic government of the previous ,ection. Outside this interval
Lbc~ nwc~r,e~ hulds. 'I'his implies that. the downward adjustments of the government debtI sl
Lcttvc~cn ihc~ Iwu tylx~. uf gu~c~rn,nrnl ,lilfrr clcl,rucling un thr atnuunt, o( debL inheriled.
I~ur valucs uf thc debt passcd uvcr frum the pnviuus period outside this interval, the
guvernment deht will tempurarily decreasc aL a latger rate with the rnyopic type of
govert,uteut, whereas in sotne future pcriocl thc inherited debt may be in the interval
( Bo, I3' ) aud the rcverse holds. In other words, the speed at which the government
adjusl.s il.s dcht docs not give an indication as to what type the incumbent government
actually is.
5 Concluding remarks
'Chis papc~r focu~ed on two qucstions. 1~irst, how much is a government able to borrow
without running into solvency problems. The second question was when will it redeem
its debL. Iti answcring the (irst yucstion couditiuns werc derived in Section `L defining a
viable set of fscal policies. "I~he wcll known NPC condition together with a feasibility
cundil.ion wcrr shuwn tu Lc suflicic~nt for a. crcdihle fiscal policy. Though these conditions
,c~,~,n tu Lt' Sl'll t'vldt~llt, tht'V IIA~'l' nul I,c~c~n furn,ulatcd siiuulta.ncously befure as Far as
wc~ aro awarc~. Must authurs c„n(inc~ tJirnt.tielvo, hv ,ising thc~ No-Ponzi-Came. As an
cscel,tiun I~n~nic~rs ( I!1~!)) has li,rnutlatecl a cullateral takeu to he Lhe present value of
Lhc taxin~; ralr,c il.y ~„ .,n cxt.r, runclil.iu,i nc~st t„ I hc, N1'(~-conclit.i,ni. I`s wc have argued
iu Sc~cl.iun '~, t.hi, ruuditio,i i, uut, sullicicuL fur ensuring via.bility eitlter. Every period
thc~ tax ratc shuuld be below a maxituunt feasahle tax rate. lf that is the case, obviously
taxes will never grow faster than tlte colla.tcra.l as just defined. The collateral is thus
redundant as a couditiou t'cstrictiug debt polic'y by the government.
In the third sectiou of t.his paper we introduced a inodel with different non-altruistic over-
lapping generations living at the same time having constant and equal labor incomes.
Without. loss uf gencrality a zcru rate of pol~ulation growth was assumed. The govern-
ment waa se~a, as a tncrlting pot of Lhe diffcrcnt groups present. Its objective function
was a weighl.c,l averagc~ of the utilitirs of these groups. ~fhe government was assumed to
hc a Stackclhrrg Ic~:cd,~r Lut h tuwanl~ t.hc priv.,,to scctur and Luwards futtnc governments.
"fhus, in it, clrci,iuu ntaking thc hrhavior of t,hc privat.e se~ctor ~s re(lected by its savings,
as well as t,hc in,plirat.ious of thc~ fiscsl policy adol,ted on future government decisions
was takc~n iut,,;u r„nnt. Wc~ au,li~~,l wlii~ I, I,,,th uf Iax r.,lc~, ancl guvc-rn,nrut debL will be
chuscn gicc.n Ihat Llu~ li-a.~ihililv cunclitions r,rc uhc.ycd a.nd e;ivcn Lhc fact. Lhat diffcrcut
gc,nc~ral.iu,is r,ui havc~ ,IiIG~n~nl I,n~G~n,ur,,., un Jrhl. p„lir~ ,lu,~ tu dilfcrf,nL horizons. As
wc assutncd pcrlcct f„resigl,t. Ly thc curreuL deci,iun n,akcrs aud nu iutrageneratioual
iucomc incyualit.y the I,ussihilil,~~ of debt rcpudiation was cxcluded. But it can be arguedLhat tax shifting between diffemnt geuerations which occws iu our model can be inter-
proted as a spc~cial fortn uf deht repudiatiou. Uebt policy is the outrome of a compromise
betwc~eu dilfercut generatiuus. l~uless the debt cau be rolled over to future generations
the yuung wunld prefer higl,er tax rates than t.hc old. It appears that the evolution of the
tax rate. and thc~ dc~Lt is drte~rntined by an interplay of the political power of the young
aud uld gc-nrrat.ions, t.he~ iutcrc~st rate aud rxte uf time prefereuce. This reflects the fact
that Lhe yonng du not wauL to pustponc Lax as they in their political role take account of
the negat.ivt~ rela.tiun bet.weeu ctnrenl. and future Lax rates aud the more so if the interest
rat.e or tho ,ubjertive clisrount ratc~ is high. `Che rentral result that can be derived is
t.h:c.t, t;ivc~n a dr~lrt t,uliry wil.hin Lln~ I,uunrls ini~,u.,~~l I,y thr~ vi:,l,ilil y runJil.ions, Lhc- Lax
rate~ an,l thr~ gr,vc,rutnc~nt ,IrLt. will bc~ nun-incrc,aaiug iu the cow~se of tirne if the rate
of interc,t c,r thc~ subjc~rt ivr ratc~ uf I,irnc~ I,rc~fc~rc~ncc, is liigh or the political power of the
rJrl is I,~~~, wliil, IIn~ i,.vr~r,r~ hrrl,l. if Ih,~ r:rtr~ r,l int~~n~a ur Lhr sul,jrrliv,~ rato of f.imo
preli~mnrc, i, luw ur thc~ pulitiral I,uwer uf t.he uld is I,igl,. lu the latter case, the gov-
rrn,nc~nt ,Ic,l,l w~ill ho inrn~asin~; ,nonc,tuuir:,lly, a,ytnputit.ically n~aching the maximum
feasablc upperbouud un the goverumeut dcrbt. '1'his raises doubts on the validity of em-
pirical studies tryiug tu investiga.te thc~ solveuc~ of tht~ government: the development of
Lhc, guve~riinu~nl dc,ht ran follow :r nuu-stat.ionary serics for a. considerable lapse of time
wil,hout Lhc~ guvc~rntnc~nt cvcr r,muittg intu solvenry problems.
In Secl.iuu -I thc~ guvc~runtc~ttt, was assuntecl tu n,axintire a social welfare function so that
thc~ ntililv uf fntiuc, firnrr:,tiuii. w:~, tal:,~n intu arru~int.. S,nprisingly, Lhe resulting
evulutiun uf Lhc' I,ax ratcy a.nd ihe~ guvcrtinu~nt deht a,rc~ csseutially the same as under the
rnyopic guvc~rnn,cut whirh acts as a Stackc Iberg leader towa,rds future generations. The
puint, is Lh:ct a ntyupic gover,nnent alLhough it, is able to steer the future to a certain
c-stc~nl, it i. n„t ahlc, t„ ,,sl,h,it thc~ li,l un~ r,nnl,lc,tcly. In I,artirul~.r, since one day the
zyaLc~tn will n~:,rli iis I,liysir:,l liinil.ti in tc~rnis ul L:,xin~, c:,l,:,cit.y, Lhc~ c~lfc~rl,ivc politiral
puwcr uf t,hc~ yc,inih will suunc~r ur latc,r gc~t. Ir,rgc, c~nough w lead to positive tax rates.
'I lii.~ G,rl rraiirl., Lh, I,r,..viLilil~'r,f,~arlic,i y;r,~r~r,nn,~i,l.ti Lu I,ua.l,r,nr Lax pa.ymc~ut.s. In
I,artirular, Lhc~ It,t.,nc~ I,ulitical l,uwe~r uf Lhe yutu,g plays the same role in the positive
model as altruism towards futtu~e generations in the normative model.
Of coursc, the model developc,d in 1.his paper is not rich enough in economic and polit-
ic'al cu„tc~ul tu Lc~ ahlc~ tu givc~ an inLc~rl,rc~t.a,liun uf n,rronl.day pulirics. I}owever, the
fc,rrcti Lh:,t arc~ inhc~n~nt in utn inc,d,.I can ,hc~d ~,un,c, light ou twu observations on ac-
tual dc~vclul,tuc~nt.s. 'I'he~ lirst lu,int iti that, starting in the 19a0s when debt-GNP ratios
won~ appruarliing ruilnv,rc,cl,~n~r~cl Ic~~c~ls, a,tart was niadc ii, m:r.ny Guropean countries
tu r,~strirt tlu~ -~,n,wth ul thc~ gr,~c.ri~uic~nt Jc~ht. In thc fran,cwork of uur model this in-'? 1
dicates, first, that the relevant variant of our rrtodel is regime (a) where debt per capita
is increasing. Secoud, it indicatrs that politicians (or the capital market) percieve the
niaximum susl,aina.ble drbt to bc" withiu close ra.nge which makes a decreasing growth
of debt necessary. The decreasing growth o( debt was reinforced by the increase in the
interest rates occuriug iu the 19t;Os. On the other Itaud, the increase of the interest rate
tnay alsu Ioad to a rc.gime ti~~'itcli. "l'he sanu, holds for a decrease in the growth rate of the
~u,~cul:~l.iuii :unl an in~ rc~a~c~ u( t he, ~,ricatc~ ~li.cuiiiit Grrtur ll. As to tho Iat.trr two e(fects
we eau refer to tbc~ :cgeiug of thc populatiou aud a gradual improvetnent of the pension
systc,ni~ aftc,r 1ti'orld 11~ar II, whirli inight, inclical,c, a hifihc~r valnc, of 0. Simtiltaneously
witli t,hc dcwc~lupiucut uf fx~nsiuu ,ystcros iti sc~vcra! couutric~s, a dcmaud for lower levels
of fiovernine~nt clc~ht has arisen.
Appendix
Solution to finite horizon problem
A solutiou to the infitiite Lorizou problem cau be obtained by solving the finite horizon
case and thru sulve for the infinite horizou problem by taking the limit. The endpoint
condition is the (init.e horizou equivalent of Lhe NPG condition, B„ - 0. By repeated
backward induction we find for Uie solution for the n period problem:
(a)0(I-~)(h'-I)-IC- ~t~ t it~tollt„-~
r„~,,, ~~ ~j~~~~~i ~ !~c-t G l3,~
Ti - r~;'.i` ~l~ '~„ C B~-, L(j~~~,,,.
T,,,,,, ;J' 11,.~ :. ~f,;, ,
for I- I,....,, - I, whet'c
-~ ~..~,.~ - - ~~ ~ ~~' ~;,~-~ft ,-~
r'j„- ~, -'~{, ( I~~o)[o{1-a){~;-1)-1] 1
- k„-cti ~ ( I f 0)R(fi- l) (R- 1)R"-etr
- C ~It"t-
IfRO 1
,~ 1~~~-~t t -c ( I f o)l~( H- I) ( R- I )I{,~-ct~and
(1 t U)n C.' '-` ,e ~
r,,.c -[0(I - a) t 1](I t nll) n`-r } n„-rfr -o n t
[e(I - a)(n - i) - l](I t r{a)
t (l tn)n(n- i) t
I
t(1{ - I )n„-r-r
(I~)o(l-~)(I{-I)-I~- ~ta crt,~out„-,
r r„~„~ l~ Ij~`,~,~ c n,-r C B;~
Sll r~~.~'.A tJ !1; G H,- r ~ 13~f ~
(ur l- 1, . , n- l ancl b. - 1, .. , rr - t- I, whcrc~
i; "-'-~ I tnU ~(1{Ail-IJ11-~)AUA-l11-~)Utl]k(n-I)~ l3,",-- ~ 1{`t
If~~-' ~-u (I tll)I{ ( I-a)AUx(I{-l)nA
-~
(I t ~flll{
~i-r t I{,Giti L l;,
an~l
,,,,.A 11 I l~llf ! t;
r...,r - (0( I-.1) t 1111 t Ifll) lIf`-~
I I{ - I t
I tUn r(Il(I-a)(n-I)-I]I{A } 11- U 1 1
(I t-IJ)I{ IL R~(n-I) J ItUI{n-`t` 1
aud for pe~riud rr
.~
r" - '~ t 1{(!{13„-r
t ~~]
"I'Icc wluliun lu Lhr inlinitc~ Iruriruu prublc~rn (:{-3:3) is clorivcJ Iry taking the limit. ~igure 5
providc~s a graplrica.l illntitraliun.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof:
7 he fullowing Lcmma is trivially satisficd:
r~ -
Lemma r,,, is nou-decrcasing in B,-r23
-" 6".--
.-. B~ra n
Figure 5: Myupic solution for the finite horizon case
Case (tt~ 0(1 - a)( R - 1) - 1 G U
i. Bt-tGB~ifO(1-a)(R-1)-1G0.
Suppose Bt-t 1 B~ for some t.
lnserting the budgetcoustraint for period t a.nd rewriting, gives:
C 1 f RO
t ~ - x.~ -t I!-l~(lf0)(11-])r
(A) If rIX,.t - r"" - 0. we have Bi-t G- Hi- B"""
[3ut since Bo 1 B""" there must be some j G t- 1 such that B~ - Bm'" and
ij i Bm'" I-t
~ Suppose 6~-t G L3 . 1'hen r~~ - rm`" - 0 and B~ - RBj-1 t G. But since
B~ - B""" we must have 6~-t --RCt - B""" Contradiction.
~ Suppose 13" G B~-t C L3,,,.
7'hen r' - rv~t - tteR jB -F c 1tReo(1-~)(R-i)-ij "o,~ oo.~ e(i-.i)tt](ttao) ` i-i R-t } tfé R(R-l) J and
B- e t-a ii R } a i-.~ R-t -t ~. - ttt3e e t-a R-t -t Since B- gm~n ~- 9(t-.~)ft i~ e(t-.~)tt (R-t) tto e(t-a)tt (R-t)' ~
wc havc -~{-t -F t~fo(t-'`)}Rl(R-t). But then B~-t G!3 . Contradiction.
~ Suppose B~-i ~ B~, - B"'~'. 'I'hcn r,x,.~ - r"`aT - I and B~ - RB~-i -}
~~ -~} , B ISllt since Ij~ - 11,'."' we have B~-t --R~-t t~}ó H G B."aT
Contradictíon.
(I3) If r,,,.i - r,"~it -
h(~oÍfii-irn) ~l;`-' { ir~-i E~io o t ~~jir~L~ wc have Bi-t 1
-it-t }(tte~~tt-t) - B"'"`. 13ut siuce Bo G B"'~T there tnust be sotne j G t- 1
such that B~ - B'""r aud B~-t G B"'a~~ Suppose B,-t G~,. Then r;~,~ - r""n - 0 and B~ - RB~-I ~-G. Since
B, - B"'"r weget B,-~ --RGi-}(ttójH(íor-IJ. But then 1 G 1-B(1-a)(R-1).
C'onl.radiction sincr, a C I. -
~ tin)i(tu~t~ ~!'~, - !f~-i ~ l1... -. lf,,,~, . ')I~I~on TW~~ - roo~ -
cto R jB c ifrto o(c--V(R-I)-Il e r-a
o(i-.~)fi)(itRO) l l-~ f a-i ~ ito R(R-I) 1 and R~ - Ret-atlBi-t f
n{i- ~ rr-i -i ~, - {itRO u i-~~rr-i -i
(n(~ ~lfi (R-i) (~I~ -~1ti (R-i)(ito)
tiintr !l, - !3„~"' ~~c havt, !!,-~ - - lt-i f (cfej(ii i) - Bm"s. Contradiction.
(C) If r,x,~ - r'n~' - I wc óavc Bc-i C -r;-~ } Itto)(R t) - B'""~ Since r~t - rmas
we must have Bc-~ - B"`a~. But since Bo C B""~ there must be some j C t- 1
such thaL B~ - Bma` and B,-t G B"'a .
~ Supposc~ B,-~ C B,,,. 1'hen r;,~ - r"`"` - 0 and Bi - RB~-i ~ G. Since
I3, -!3„~.,r wt~get !3, ~--R~-~ }(ifó)i~~H-~). l3ut theu l G 1-4(I-a)(R-1).
Contraclict.iou sinc c~ G I.
t. Suppose B, C B,-t G B.a, - B„`a Then r~.i - r~i-
t~u R B c ifRa u{c-.~)(R-i)-t e t a
B(t-,`)}t (IfHB) ~~-c t R-1 f- ctu R(R-i) 1 and Bi - Ro(t-a tr Bi-t f
B t-a R-] -1 I}RB B 1-.a R-1 -1
B(l-.~)~I ( R-1)~á - B(1-`)}1 (R-t)(1}B)
Since B, - B""'r we have B~ i--R c~(Ité~~Rt) - B~`"s Contradiction.
ii. B,-t - Bc if 0(1 - a)(R - I)- l- 0.
Note that in tlcis casc~ it xlways holds that r' ~- r,"`~.
"Cakiug the budgeL consl,raint, iusert.ing rx'~ aud rewritiug gives:
!3, - ) ~ ~( I - a)( R - I ) - I !j~ i -I- 0( l - a)(R - 1) - 1 ~.,
o(I-a)tl ~ (o(I-a)tl](t;'-I)
Sinc.e 0(I - a)(!i - 1)- I- 0 we liave Bt - Bt-~.
r' c G r~ c-c.
"1'his follows inunediatel~ [rom part i. ancl the Lenuna.
Case(6JB(}-a)(R-1)-1~0.
Bc ? Bt-c.
Suppose Bc G Bc-1 for some t. }nserting the budget constraint and rewriting gives:
G' IfRO
Bc-t ~ -R- 1 } (1 -FB)(R- 1)ra,.c
(A) If r,;~ r- rn"" - ~~RÓ ~Bt-~ ~ RGt~ we have Bc-t G- R~t. Contradiction.(B) If rIX - r"'f - It}o)x [[3f t t G t~~B(t-~zH-~] we have Br-1 ~
,.f x,.f - lo(t-,~)},j(,}~tol H-t ite R
-~ -} ~ B'-'~ R-~ But then Bf-t 1 B„o. Contradiction.
~~-t i}o B(i-~)(rt-t)-i R'
(C) If r. - r",~" - I we havr~ Ilf-i ~- c- t ~}rto - !j,"~ .(:ontradiction.
.r,,f ~ If-f (Í~BI(R-t)
T.~,.f , r~...f-I'
Tlfis follows inunerlia.tely frunf (,art i. and the Lemma.
Q.E.D.
Solution social optimizer's problem
H} appl~ing rc~l,f~zrtr,d hackwarcl iuductiou aud Iaking account of the restrictions a so-
lution ran hr- rlc~rivr,cl to Lhr~ soc ial u~,t.in,izr,r.' (,rul,lem uf Sr~ctiun 4. For h?p - 1 ~ 0
au explicit solntiun lur rf' wa, Rivfrn in t.his Sect.iou -a. No explicit expression for rt was
givru in f asc~ ul lip - I G 0. II I,ruvccl in,~,utisil,b~ to clr,rivr~ au cxplicit solution, only
intplicitly thr~ ,ulnt.iun r~ .,ti r, liun tiun uf H,-t r.an hc clr~ticribcd. 'I'his solution is given
hv thr~ lowir cnvclopr~ uf an iulinitr, uumher of tangent lines of the following form
rA. - R( ~ t (1)( I- P) j ~3f-i t
Cr - Í t RIÍ f I- R-k-t - 1-
PkP)J ~ (Íf-li0)(I-p~}t)l N-I Itf) IL li-1 R(1-
fur k - I,..., x.
I~ii;urf~ G ~,nf~ iflf~., :, p,r,,~,hif:,I illn.,rr:~l.ifm. 'I'In, Iffri f,f Lhc~ ),uinls f,f Lhf~ sulnl.iun are fiivr`n
bv
G 1 1}RB x-k-'(R-t)}H-"-IVkIt-RVI-n`ll-c)j
Qt-t --R-t - aklt-v) t}B [ R-t 1
rf - 1 t ~l~l.-A ~}~
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof:
"1'hc folluwing Ir~ntina i, trivially satisfiecL
Lemma r~".f is notrdecrca~sing iu Bf-irigurc G
Case (a~ Rp - 1 C 0.
i. Bi-r c B, if lip G 0.
Suppose B~-~ ~ B~ for some t.
luscrting the budget constraint a.nd rewriting gives:
G 1-~RO
~ G B-r -- R- l}(1 i t7)(R - 1)rx,.i
(A) If r,x,"~ - rm" - ll wi, havc~ !3,-~ G-rtri - Bm'" Rut since Bo ~ B""" there must
br, sumc j G t- I sucó that. B~ - B""" aud B~-~ ~ Bry""
~ Suppose B~-~ G B'o`. Then r,~.~ - rm'" - 0 and B~ - RB~-1 f G. But since
B~ - B""" we must havc B~-r --Hrr - B"" . Contradiction.
~ Suppose BKK` G B~-~ G B",o
Then r,~;~ - r~i'~o~ -
R(r~tRa}Bt ~Bi-r -F R~i ~(R rt~rtR)htB1a(RP - I)~ and
B, - RpB,-i t r~~C -~ ó r~rito~i~ . Sincc B, - Bm~" we have B~-~ -
- r-' ~- ~~ r;~-~,. 13ut then B,-~ G BW. Contradiction.
H-1 IfB (H-1)a
~ Suppose B~-~ - B"'"~. Then r~,~ - rm"r - 1 and B~ - RB~-r t G- lí ~BB.
13ut since B- B""" we have B-r -- ~ f~RB' G Bm"s. Contradiction. ~- 1 R-I ifB R
(B) If r,w,i -
r;~i,,,,,. - R i'}HBtB
lB`-~ } R~'r ~(R-~)fr~-o)(rtelv(Hp-
1)J we have
B~ ~~~~ f ~}~;o - B"`"r 13ut sincc Bo G B"`ar there must be some j
- R-~ (R-~l(rtB)
such that B~ - BmaT and 8~-~ G Bm"T. From the budget constraint we have
B- RB f C.' -~r'o` . Insertin 6- Bmas and r'o` - r'"r''o` and rewriting l )-r ~.FO oo.~ g ~ oo~i ~,~gives: B,-, --R~, ~ tR ~iJ(rteJ - B"~'. Contradiction.
aoc a C 14RB mas soc mar (C) If rx,.r - rm r- I we have B,-, C-1;-r f ir}BJ~R-rJ - B . Since r~r - r
we tnust have B,-, - B'""~'. 13ut since Bo G Bmar there must be some j such
that B, - B"`ar and B,-, G Bmar. From the budget constraint we have B~ -
~na,~ao I~B,-i f G' - r} I é r~~. Inserting B~ - Bmas and r~,~ - r~~ and rewriting
gives: B,-, --l;~r -l- iR~~JRtBJ - Bmas Contradiction.
i;. 8,-, - B, if Rp - l - u.
,nr.,~,~ Notc that. iu tlii. crw5c wc alwe,~, havi, r'".~ - r,~,., .
~ ~,~r.,~~ 'faking tl,~, bu~lget constraiut. inn,~rting r,~.. ~ aucl rewriting gives:
Ir,, J Ir, rr,,rt, ~ i
~It-J
Sinie l~p - I wo h.,v~~ B, - B,-i.
rx..i-~ G r~'.i'
'fhis folluws in,n,e~lialc~ly from p~rt. i. and thc, Len,nra..
Case G. Rp - I ~ 0.
8,-, 1 B,.
In tlris caso B,-, and thc adjoining tax ratc~ r, arc givcn by
(- I ,tRO I{-"-~(!t-I)}Ir-"-~U`I~-RoJ-u`Ir-vJ li,-~ - -R-i - akll-vJ ~t0 R-i
T, - I ~ ~IR-A I}~Ail
Consider sunii, k- A-. Inse~rting tlu~ a.cl.juining B,-, and r, into the budget constraint
t;ivcs an ,~~I,n,~siuu lur 11,:
~i I I i-HPIR-r`-~(R-])fR-k-~pk(1-RP)-Pk(1-P)
Ijr - - R- I - 1,À(1 - p) I f 0 R- 1
('o,nl,arcil Lu !3,-i th~~ ~,ustulati~ iinnrccliatca~~ fullows.
r x,a- i ~ r,'~,'
~
5iuce B,-, ~ l3, thcre is by construction a k C k which corresponds to B~-t. Since
`k G 0 the tax rate is decreasing in k. It immediately follows that r~~-r ~ r~i
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